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Abstract Samuel Scheffler has recently defended what he calls the ‘afterlife
conjecture’, the claim that many of our evaluative attitudes and practices rest on the
assumption that human beings will continue to exist after we die. Scheffler contends
that our endorsement of this claim reveals that our evaluative orientation has four
features: non-experientialism, non-consequentialism, ‘conservatism,’ and future
orientation. Here I argue that the connection between the afterlife conjecture and
these four features is not as tight as Scheffler seems to suppose. In fact, those with
an evaluative orientation that rejects these four features have equally strong moral
reasons to endorse the existence of the collective afterlife.
Keywords Immortality  Value  Time  Morality  Impersonal versus personal
values
Samuel Scheffler argues that the intelligibility of our evaluative perspectives and
practices rests on the largely unrecognized assumption that humanity will continue
to exist after our individual lives end. More specifically, were we to lose confidence
in the existence of the ‘‘collective afterlife,’’ then ‘‘many of the things that now
matter to us would come to matter to us less, in the sense that we would see less
reason to engage with them, would become less emotionally invested in them, and
would be less convinced of their value or worth.’’ (Scheffler 2013: 51) Scheffler in
turn takes the importance that we assign to the collective afterlife as manifestations
of four central features of our evaluative outlooks. In particular, the importance of
the collective afterlife indicates that our evaluative outlooks:
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1. Are non-experientialist Assuming that we are not personally immortal and
bodily death represents the cessation of our individual existences, we will not
experience any events that occur after our deaths. The fact that we nevertheless
care that humanity continues to exist after we die thus illustrates that ‘‘it is not
only our experiences that we value or that matter to us.’’ (Scheffler 2013: 20)
2. Are non-consequentialist The destruction of the human species would be bad in
many ways, bringing to an end all human joy, love, and so on. But it would also
mean the cessation of genocide, torture, and misery. But we do not, Scheffler
proposes, naturally react to the prospect of imminent human extinction by
trying to ‘‘do the sums, by trying to figure out whether on balance the prospect
of the destruction of the earth was welcome or unwelcome.’’ (Scheffler 2013:
21) This underscores how reasoned evaluative judgments rest on considerations
besides which actions or events have the best overall consequences.
3. Are ‘‘conservative’’ There is, Scheffler asserts, ‘‘something approaching a
conceptual connection between valuing something and wanting it to be
preserved.’’ (Scheffler 2013: 22) Hence, despite the fact that we will not be
present when subsequent generations recognize or act upon our values, we
nevertheless hope that those generations will exist in order to preserve our
values (or perhaps other values that are least causal descendants of our values).
4. Include future-oriented personalization The role of the collective afterlife in
sustaining our existing values reflects a desire for a ‘‘personalized’’ normative
relationship with the future, according to Scheffler. Our mortality ensures that
large portions of the future will not happen to us. Yet if humanity continues to
exist after each of us dies, then it is at least possible for our human successors to
share the very values over which we currently exercise custodianship. If so,
then even though death brings our autobiographies to an end, our biographies
continue inasmuch as we are not forgotten and our social identities persist
beyond the time after our deaths. The collective afterlife assures us that if
resurrected, we would not, Scheffler says, find the world inhospitable to our
hopes and values. (Scheffler 2013: 29–34)
My aim in this paper is not to cast doubt on Scheffler’s claim that each of us has
reason to hope that humanity exists after we die. Nor is it to cast doubt on whether
agents whose evaluative outlooks have the four features just enumerated would have
reason to hope for the collective afterlife. Rather, my concern is to interrogate just
how tight the connection is between the hope for the collective afterlife and these
four features. In other words, would agents whose evaluative outlooks did not
contain one or more of these features also have reason to hope that humanity exists
after they die? I shall argue that they would—that agents whose evaluative outlooks
are experientialist, consequentialist, non-conservative, and oriented impersonally
toward the future would have at least as much reason to hope that humanity
continues after they themselves cease to exist as would individuals whose evaluative
outlooks encompass these four features.1 Hence these four features are not as
1 My critique of Scheffler is also germane to Lenman’s position (2002) that only from a ‘‘generation-
centered perspective’’ can human extinction be thought bad.
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essential to the rational hope for the collective afterlife as Scheffler believes. My
critique thus has good news and bad news for Scheffler: His claim that we have
reason to hope for the collective afterlife probably has wide appeal, but probably
does not require the specific evaluative outlook Scheffler supposes it does. I
conclude by illustrating how the contrast between the evaluative outlook Scheffler
describes and the one I outline here rests on deep and largely unexplored
philosophical disagreements about the relationship between time and value. Very
roughly, for Scheffler, time’s asymmetrical character, i.e., its movement through
past, present, and future, in addition to time’s scarcity within the lifetime of any one
individual, renders intelligible our personal concerns and values. Whereas on the
alternative evaluative outlook I describe here, time does not structure our individual
evaluative outlooks and commitments. Time is simply a medium in which value can
be realized.
I should say at the outset that Scheffler may not intend that the relationship
between the hope for a collective afterlife and these four evaluative commitments to
be especially strong. As he puts it, our hope for a collective afterlife ‘‘supports a
nonexperientialist interpretation’’ of our values (Scheffler 2013: 20); ‘‘suggests’’
that our values have a nonconsequentialist dimension (Scheffler 2013: 21);
‘‘highlights’’ a conservative dimension to our valuing (Scheffler 2013: 22); etc
(emphases added).2 So Scheffler does not state anything so strong as that the hope
for a collective afterlife implies or requires these evaluative commitments. A more
charitable reading, then, is that Scheffler holds that our hope for the collective
afterlife is evidence for our evaluative outlooks having these four features, even if it
does not logically imply their having these four features. If so, then my critique may
be seen as undermining that evidence instead of demonstrating that our hope for the
collective afterlife does not imply the four evaluative features Scheffler identities. In
any event, the examination of the relationship between our apparent hope for the
collective afterlife and the evaluative commitments that may or may not explain that
hope is a fruitful exercise regardless of precisely how Scheffler understands that
relationship.
1 Non-experientialism
Let us begin then with the claim that our hope for the collective afterlife illustrates
that at least some of our values do not rest entirely on the qualities or contents of our
experiences.
Scheffler acknowledges that entertaining scenarios in which the human species
goes extinct causes many people distress. It is tempting, then, to infer that what is
bad about human extinction is an experiential fact, namely, that existing human
beings find that prospect upsetting, But that, Scheffler argues, gets matters the
2 See also Scheffler’s reply to Seana Shiffrin (Scheffler 2013: 192–195), where he seems to backtrack on
how fundamental conservatism, non-experientialism, and non-consequentialism are to our reactions to the
prospect of human extinction.
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wrong way around: We either would not feel, or have any reason to feel, distress at
the prospect of human extinction if that possibility did not matter to us already.
…what would matter to us, in the first instance, would not be our distress—
though that might matter to us too—but rather the predicted postmortem event
whose contemplation gave rise to that distress. If the postmortem event did not
matter to us, there would be nothing for us to be distressed about in the first
place. (Scheffler 2013: 20)
Scheffler takes the fact that we react to the prospect of human extinction with
distress, or at least with something more than indifference, to show, in the spirit of
Robert Nozick’s ‘‘experience machine,’’ that at least some of our values or cares do
not derive from the qualities or contents of our experiences. In many cases, we care
principally that some state of affairs comes about, not that we experience that state
of affairs.
Exactly what we find distressing when contemplating human extinction is far
from obvious. But a coherent story can be told wherein our distress is rationally
explicable in terms of experiences alone being the bearers of value.
Suppose that Scheffler is correct that it is rational to react to the prospect of
human extinction with distress. He is probably correct to say few of us would
dismiss this distress on the basis that the destruction of humanity will not be
something that happens to us. We will (most likely) not be present for the extinction
of humanity, and so we must not be ‘‘indifferent to everything that happens after our
deaths.’’ (Scheffler 2013: 19) But the fact that the doomsday scenario will not befall
us does not show that our distress at this scenario befalling our descendants is not
ultimately grounded in attitudes toward experiences. It may, for example, matter to
me that those of our descendants who must confront the species’ extinction—the
last generation, we may dub them—will themselves undergo many terrible
experiences. They will, for example, see many of their projects and commitments
fail to come to fruition, while all of their projects and commitments that will have
come to fruition are nullified. Depending on precisely the doomsday scenario
unfolds, the last generation may undergo repeated and profound grief as their loved
ones die off. Likewise, their deaths and the deaths of others may be prolonged and
painful. A being possessed with universal empathy is likely to experience the
experiences of the last generation as distressing. When we contemplate other
horrifying human fates (for example, life as a ‘lucky’ laborer in a Nazi death camp),
we are horrified at what it would be like to suffer such a fate. At most then, Scheffler
seems to have shown that our distress at the prospect of human extinction is
powerful evidence against our normative solipsism, i.e., that we are capable of
seeing the sad fates of others as worth lamenting, and where possible, worth
preventing. Yes, ‘‘it is not only our experiences that we value or that matter to us.’’
It is also the experiences of others. Experientialism, understood as the claim that
only mental states are the bearers of value, is not refuted by our distress at
contemplating the eventual destruction of the human species.
Scheffler may respond by claiming that these observations merely push back the
question at hand. Suppose that our distress at human extinction is vicarious or at one
remove, directed at the distress we imagine the last generation would experience.
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But why, he may ask, do the members of the last generation experience their distress
then? May not Scheffler argue that my experientialist explanation of our distress
runs aground, unable to explain the ultimate source of our distress?
Here we may turn to experientialist explanations of why death can be bad for
individuals or merit fear. Many philosophers endorse the deprivation account of
how death can be bad for an individual. (Nagel 1970) On this view, death is bad for
a person not because the state of being dead is bad for us. Indeed, assuming that
personal immortality is not in the offing, death is not a state of us but is instead, as
Epicurus put it, nothing to us. Rather, death at a given moment in time is bad if,
when, and to the extent that death at that time deprives a person of having a better
life overall than she would have had by continuing to live to a further point in time.
Death, on this account, is a comparative or counterfactual bad—not bad in its own
right, but bad when it results in our lives not going as well as they would have. The
deprivation account is of course compatible with any number of theories of value or
well-being, including (most importantly for our purposes) an experientialist theory.
In other words, death at a given time would be bad for an individual on the
experientialist deprivation account if and only if the life that individual would have
experienced by living to some future point in time would have been better overall
than the life she experienced by dying at that time. If so, then our distress at the
experiences of the last generation can be explained at least in part by our
empathizing with their plights, namely, with the facts that their deaths will deprive
them of valuable experiences that would have made their lives better for them
overall.
Suppose, however, that the deprivation account of death’s badness is incorrect.
Scheffler believes that there is an additional reason for members of the last
generation to fear death. He claims that a large part of our fear of death is ‘‘a special
sort of panic induced by the prospect that the egocentric subject—the subject of all
one’s thoughts and attitudes, including the very attitudes one is experiencing as one
contemplates one’s death—will cease to exist.’’ (Scheffler 2013: 102) According to
Scheffler, this is not a fear of the state of being dead. For even though we are certain
that our being dead is a state that will eventuate, we may nevertheless fear the
cessation of personhood death represents. But nor is this kind of fear of death a brute
or involuntary physiological response. In Scheffler’s eyes, the ‘‘unwanted cessation
of one’s existence’’ is rationally perceived as a threat to the existence of our
persisting selves. (Scheffler 2013: 102–103) Presumably, this ‘existential’ fear will
be especially acute or pervasive among members of the last generation, particularly
if human extinction is the result of Scheffler’s doomsday scenario, in which all of
humanity is killed by a single catastrophic event. After all, the last generation is
forced to confront, by virtue of their awareness of the species’ imminent extinction,
their own mortality, the cessation of their own existence, on an ongoing basis. We,
on the other hand, have the luxury of not knowing the time or circumstances of our
own demise. Our distress at the extinction of humanity may thus stem from an
empathetic awareness that the last generation will be compelled to confront death in
particularly harrowing ways.
Obviously, there are deep philosophical questions to be hashed out between
experientialism and non-experientialism, particularly regarding the priority of
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experiences and their objects in explaining value. My point here is simply that our
distress at the prospect that collective immortality is imperiled—that some future
generation will be the last human generation—does not provide independence
evidence against experientialism, as Scheffler seems to maintain. For we may
coherently suggest that (a) the experiences of the last generation would be bad for
them qua experiences, and (b) our distress is a rational experiential response to the
last generation’s likely experiences and is bad for us for that very reason.
2 Non-consequentialism
Scheffler also claims that our distress at the prospect of humanity disappearing
reveals our non-consequentialist evaluative commitments. He predicts that we
would not react to this prospect by summing up the value of the good and bad
outcomes associated with humanity’s disappearance. Our distress thus seems to
transcend consequentialist considerations.
I suspect Scheffler is probably correct that our immediate theoretically naive
response to the prospect of human extinction is that it is a catastrophic tragedy.
However, it is not obvious that this response should be taken as the last word. In one
respect, that immediate reaction may be consequentialist but egocentrically so: We
intuit, however dimly, that human extinction would be bad for us as individuals.
Indeed, if my earlier remarks about experientialism are correct, our initial response
may reflect a desirable sympathy with those future individuals who will constitute
the last generation. So I do not believe that our initial response is necessarily a non-
consequentialist one.
Beyond this, it is worth noting that Death and the Afterlife does not primarily
treat human extinction as a practical problem. Scheffler is centrally interested in
establishing claims about our attitudes toward human extinction and what these
attitudes in turn tell us about our evaluative practices. And while there are nods in
the direction of the practical thesis that (given our apparent evaluative investment in
the collective afterlife) we ought to act so as to ensure the future survival of
humanity, Scheffler generally does not address human extinction as a problem about
which we should try to do anything. However, were we to think of human extinction
as a practical problem, impersonally consequentialist considerations should
certainly play a central role in our deliberations about that problem.
Suppose that Scheffler’s afterlife conjecture is correct: Our values and well-being
depend crucially on the existence of subsequent human generations capable of
valuing in the ways that we do. What importance should this dependence have in
our deliberations about human procreation and population? One of the strange
conceits of the branch of philosophy known as ‘‘population ethics’’ is that choices
relevant to future populations are presented as if they were made from the
perspective of a social engineer or policymaker. While polities engage in
‘‘population ethics’’ choices inasmuch as they have policies that provide incentives
for or against procreation, the number and constitution of future human populations
are largely the result of many individual choices and actions. But suppose we
indulge that conceit for a moment and imagine that we, acting as if a single person,
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could determine the future human population. Suppose further that we learn that the
human population, for whatever reason, is in steady and rapid decline. Again,
Scheffler may be correct that our initial individual response to this news would have
a non-consequentialist feel: utter disbelief, shock, distress, without reference to the
possible benefits of human extinction. But once we moved to the sustaining of the
human species as a practical challenge, consequentialist considerations would be
paramount. If Scheffler is correct, then the threat human extinction poses to our
value should be abated. But few would think that we should sustain our values by
ensuring the existence of future generations no matter how those generations might
live. Suppose that the rapid deterioration in the human population is due to
accelerating environmental degradation, and while we could act now to ensure the
existence of future generations, those generations would have lives barely worth
living. No reasonable person would deny that the poor level of welfare of these
future individuals ought to play some role in our deciding whether or not to bring
them into existence. This would in turn compel us to ask how important the
collective afterlife is to our own values and well-being. In other words, could the
misery of these future humans be sufficient to persuade us not to try to abate the
decline in human populations, even when juxtaposed with our being assured that
these future generations will enable our own values to endure?
In entertaining such questions, our reasoning would have the hallmarks of
consequentialist thinking: weighing different outcomes, taking into full account
both facts that would contribute to different outcomes being better and facts that
would contribute to different outcomes being worse, perhaps identifying the state of
affairs that we might produce which has the best outcome overall, and so on. I
readily concede that the determinations we might make in such circumstances could
be guided in a non-consequentialist way. Inspired by LeGuin (1973) we might, for
example, decide that it would be wrong to bring individuals into existence so as to
sustain our own evaluative practices and outlooks, especially if those individuals
will have barely livable lives. We might see bringing those individuals into
existence as an egregious instance of treating them merely as means. But if we
arrived at such non-consequentialist conclusions, we are likely to be led to them by
reasoning about these population choices, not because that reasoning presupposes a
non-consequentialist moral framework.
Just as I did not attempt to show that our distress at the prospect of human
extinction decisively favors an experientialist over a non-experientialist account of
value, I do not attempt to show that how we react and respond to the prospect of
human extinction decisively favors a consequentialist over a non-consequentialist
account of moral reasoning. However, when we approach human extinction not
purely as a matter of the attitudes that prospect elicits but as a matter of choices
about whether to prevent human extinction, consequentialist considerations come to
the fore in an especially forceful way. Again, our reactions to the prospect of human
extinction do not seem to provide independent evidence for a non-consequentialist
interpretation of our evaluative habits and attitudes.
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3 Conservatism
Scheffler claims that death poses a problem for our ‘‘conservatism’’ about value.
‘‘We want to act in ways that help to preserve and sustain the things that we value,
but death marks the end of our ability to do this.’’ (Scheffler 2013: 32) Enter the
collective afterlife. For Scheffler, the collective afterlife holds out the hope that the
story of a person’s life does not end when the person’s life ends. If others capable of
sharing values like ours will exist after we die, then even though dying is the final
act of our lives, the future nevertheless turns out not to be a world hostile to or
alienated from our values, ‘‘more like a party one had to leave early and less like a
gathering of strangers.’’ (Scheffler 2013: 30) We therefore hope to be able to
bequeath our values (or at least our valuing) to generations that will exist after us.
Scheffler takes the relationship between this conservatism and value to be very
tight indeed, ‘‘something approaching a conceptual connection.’’ Before considering
whether he is correct about that, we should consider how this conceptual connection
is to be understood. It is unlikely that Scheffler is proposing this as an identity claim
regarding value, i.e., that the property of something being valuable just is the
property of being such that we want to act to preserve and sustain it. In the spirit of
Moore’s question argument, it does not seem incoherent to ask of some thing which
we wish to preserve or sustain whether it is also valuable. The claim does not
therefore seem to be true as a matter of semantics. Nor does it seem likely that
Scheffler offers this claim as one of necessary coextension, i.e., that any and all
valuable things are also such that we want to act to preserve and sustain them, and
vice versa. Such an interpretation would be vulnerable to putative counterexamples.
Being a child may be a valuable stage of life, but it seems misguided to want to
preserve one’s childhood—to remain a child—in perpetuity.
Most likely, Scheffler’s claim, if true, is true as a matter of conceptual entailment.
One possibility for this entailment is
(V) To value x is to want to act in ways that help to preserve and sustain x
(V) implies that those who are conceptually fluent with the notion of ‘value’ could
not fail to recognize that valuing something involves wishing to preserve or sustain
it. For on standard ways of characterizing conceptual truths, a statement expresses a
conceptual truth if and only if anyone who grasps the thought expressed by the
statement recognizes its truth. In the case of conceptual truths, assent follows more
or less immediately upon understanding. (Williamson 2006) Can it plausibly be said
of (V) that assent follows upon understanding, that a grasp of its content results in a
grasp of its truth? To my eyes, it is certainly conceivable that a grasp of this claim’s
content need not result in an individual’s grasp of its truth. Suppose that (V) is true,
but someone sincerely disputes (V). Of what can such a person be justly accused?
The most reasonable accusation is probably not conceptual incompetence. Scheffler
may maintain that the truth of (V) will really dawn on anyone who fully grasps the
claim. After all, he intends (V) to be a truth that we can genuinely discover thanks to
reflection on how we would react to the prospect of human extinction. Even those
who have not discovered the truth of (V) will discover it to be true with adequate
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reflection, and perhaps understanding (V) is the only route to knowing it to be true.
Nevertheless, if (V) represents the conceptual connection Scheffler has in mind,
then that connection can be sensibly questioned.
But Scheffler is on better ground, I would suggest, if the conceptual connection is
the opposite of that found in (V):
(W) To want to act in ways that help to preserve and sustain X is to value X
(W) is a claim wherein it seems more reasonable to challenge the conceptual
competence of someone who questions it. If we encountered someone who wanted
to preserve or sustain x but did not also believe in x’s value (either for its own sake
or for its relation to other values), it would be natural to wonder what the source of
their desire to help preserve or sustain x is if not in x’s being valuable (in her own
estimation, at least). So whereas ‘‘I value X, but I don’t want to preserve or sustain
X’’ does not seem to betray any conceptual misunderstanding or lack of
understanding regarding value, ‘‘I want to preserve or sustain X but I don’t value
X’’ betrays a conceptual misunderstanding or lack of understanding regarding value.
(W) thus appears to be the better interpretation of the conceptual basis of the
evaluative conservatism Scheffler identifies. Unfortunately though for Scheffler, the
reasons that render (W) plausible need not lend support to conservatism as such. In
keeping with the themes of the previous two sections, suppose that experientialism
and consequentialism are true—that all and only mental or experiential states are
bearers of value, and that the moral justifiability of our actions depends solely on the
net values of the states of affairs those actions bring about. From that point of view,
(W) might seem unlikely. After all, (W) seems to rest on a cross-temporal
conception of value. For Scheffler, the desire to preserve and sustain X into the
future (and in turn the desire for a collective afterlife) reflect the rootedness of our
values in our personal and collective pasts. This is evident in how he relates
conservatism about value to ‘‘traditions’’. Traditions are collaborative practices that
aim to preserve values beyond the lifespan of any single generation or individual.
When we propagate traditions, we seek to ensure the value ‘‘over time’’ of what we
value. (Scheffler 2013: 33) From Scheffler’s perspective, traditions are not good
only because of what they are traditions of. Part of what makes traditions valuable is
instead their cross-temporal dimension. We have reason to maintain those
worthwhile traditions because traditions forge evaluative relationships among past,
present, and future. The reasons to sustain or preserve our traditions derive in part
from how they extend our evaluative outlooks into the future.
Those subscribing to experientialism and consequentialism will not be hostile to
traditions as such. But they will see traditions merely as vehicle for the realization of
what is timelessly valuable. Such traditions reflect discoveries about what is
valuable or worthwhile, and their value derives wholly from what they are traditions
of. The location of a tradition in time (when it begins or ends, etc.) is not any part of
their value. A tradition of doing x is valuable because doing x is valuable,
irrespective of our temporal relationship to the tradition.
Yet from this consequentialist and experientialist point of view, to want to
preserve and sustain some valuable x can be perfectly intelligible inasmuch as
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preserving or sustaining x amounts to no more than promoting x. Advocates of this
point of view may therefore affirm that we ought to hope for or work actively to
bring about x-type occurrences, both for ourselves and for future generations. But
our reasons for this need not be Scheffler’s cross-temporal reasons. They are instead
familiar teleological or forward-looking reasons—that a better world results when x
is ‘preserved’ or ‘sustained’.
(W) can therefore be defended on terms very different from Scheffler’s
conservatism. The conceptual link between value and ‘preserving’ or ‘sustaining’
values need not be explained by appeal to Scheffler’s cross-temporal understanding
of value. We may instead see the link as reflecting the insight that preserving or
sustaining values makes for more value and for more valuable experiences overall.
Again, our reactions to the prospects of human extinction, and our corresponding
hope for a collective afterlife, can rest on an evaluative foundation different from
Scheffler’s preferred foundation.
4 Personalization
Lastly, Scheffler argues that our distress at the prospect of human extinction, and
our hope for a collective afterlife, indicates our yearning for a ‘‘personalized’’
relation with the future. If there exist generations who succeed us and share our
values, or something like those values, then the future does not present itself to us as
a hostile or alien evaluative world. Our distress at the prospect of extinction thus
reflects our being denied the possibility of a personalized relationship with the
future.
Could our distress at the prospect of human extinction, and our hope for a
collective afterlife, make sense absent a desire for a ‘‘personalized’’ relationship to
the future? An affirmative answer becomes plausible once we take stock of the sort
of conception of selves Scheffler seems to presuppose in his arguments for his
afterlife conjecture.
For Scheffler, even though dying is the final act of our lives, if there are successor
human generations, then our values may find a home in future generations. We
therefore hope to be able to pass the torch of our values (or at least of our valuing) to
generations that will exist after us. These sentiments regarding the relationship
between time and value will resonate with those who have what Galen Strawson has
called the Narrative outlook on selfhood. (Strawson 2004, 2007) This outlook both a
metaphysical component and an autobiographical component. First, those with the
Narrative outlook views their selves as ‘diachronic,’ as entities that experience
themselves as existing in the past and in the future. For a Narrativist, various events
in the past are understood as having happened to the very same present self who
recalls them. Conversely, Narrativists anticipate various future events as events that
will happen to the present self who anticipates them. Second, Narrativists impose
narrative ‘form’ on these events, with the result that they grasp or articulate their
lives as stories (and to the degree that they cannot grasp their lives as stories, strive
to fashion more narratively coherent lives for themselves). Strawson states little to
elaborate what it is for a life of a person or a self to constitute a story or narrative.
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We may adduce, however, that at a minimum, to have a narrative conception of
oneself is to assign variable ‘narrative’ significance to the events that happen to
oneself. A narrative is not just one damned (or blessed) thing after another. Instead,
a narratively organized life is structured by recognizably narrative elements.
Narratives have beginning, middles, and ends. Furthermore, these stages are
characterized by development, the onset of tensions or life challenges, climaxes, the
resolution (whether apparent or real) of tensions or challenges, etc. Each of these
stages will have their respective characters as well. At its most expansive, a
narratively lived self experiences her life as a single narrative, though of course that
single narrative will also contain many ‘substories’ or subplots with their own
respective narrative elements and structures.
In attempting to demonstrate the centrality of the collective afterlife to our
evaluative practices and commitments, Scheffler endorses both the metaphysical
and autobiographical components of the Narrativist outlook on selfhood. He clearly
sees human valuers as beings who conceptualize their personhood as extending
from the past, through the present, and into the future: In valuing, we ‘‘express our
own understanding of ourselves as temporally extended creatures with commit-
ments that endure through the flux of daily experience.’’ (Scheffler 2013: 61,
emphasis added) That we seek to uphold traditions, ‘‘collaborative, multigenera-
tional enterprises devised by human beings precisely to satisfy the deep human
impulse to preserve what is valued’’ (Scheffler 2013: 33) is further evidence for
attributing the Narrativist outlook to human beings. Schefflerian selves are therefore
diachronic selves. Though Scheffler does not explicltly use narrative language, he
evidently endorses the autobiographical component of the Narrativist outlook as
well:
… we understand a human life as having stages, beginning with birth and
ending with death, and that we understand each of these stages as having its
characteristic tasks, challenges, and potential rewards. …the fact that life is
understood as having stages, is, I take it, a universal response to the realities of
our organic existence and our physical birth, maturation, deterioration, and
death. (Scheffler 2013: 96)3
Narrativist thinking further illuminates Scheffler’s reasons for believing in the
importance of the collective afterlife. Scheffler’s worry is that without the existence
of subsequent generations of human valuers, our own lives as valuers—our
evaluative biographies, if you will—will lack satisfying conclusions or denoue-
ments. The collective afterlife ensures that the fate of our evaluative biographies do
not hang in the balance. For we can at least hope our values survive our own non-
existence. Thus, Scheffler’s argument for the desirability of the collective afterlife is
congruent with the Narrativist’s ‘‘concern for one’s past and future self, in so far as
the self has an ongoing engagement in the realisation of the non-immediate
achievements, goals, and possibilities that form and contribute to the narrative
construct.’’ (Behrendt 2007: 144)
3 See also Scheffler (2013): 100, where he speaks of these stages as being ‘‘essential to our idea of a life
that is temporally bounded.’’
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I think, then, that we can safely attribute the Narrativist outlook to Scheffler.
Moreover, Scheffler unwittingly helps to answer a challenge that death presents to
the Narrativist outlook. For Narrativists, personal immortality would not obviously
be welcome. After all, it might be thought that a coherent and unified narrative
cannot be fashioned out of an infinitely long existence. We seem, therefore, to need
death to secure life’s ending, an ending without which we are necessarily precluded
from adopting a narrative-like perspective on our existences. (MacIntyre 1984:
211–212) As Scheffler seems to affirm, ‘‘an eternal life would, in a sense, be no life
at all.’’ (Scheffler 2013: 95) Kathy Behrendt observes, however, that death does not
bring a person’s life to narrative fruition in the way that, say, a literary narrative is
brought to fruition. (Behrendt 2007: 149) We can often project or imagine narrative
arcs for a novel left unfinished, such as Twain’s Mysterious Stranger, largely
because such works can be analyzed in terms of completed literary narratives with
which we are otherwise familiar. But the narrative perspective of a life is not that of
the external observer trying to make sense of another’s story from the outside.
Rather, the relevant narrative perspective on a person’s life is that of the person
whose life it is. For Narrativists, narrative is at the heart of self-understanding or
self-definition (whatever the role of narrative may be in enabling our understanding
of others). Except in some cases of suicide, death typically brings life to a close
without the ‘author’ of that life being afforded the opportunity to conclude the
narrative. Death thus renders our self-narratives ‘‘necessarily incomplete,’’ and in so
doing, casts doubt on the Narrativist aspiration to live a ‘‘closed’’ and ‘‘completed’’
life by the person whose life it is. (Behrendt 2007: 151)
Scheffler’s arguments for the desirability, nay, the normative indispensability, of
the collective afterlife do not address this problem directly. Yet he seems implicitly
to recognize the problem described by Behrendt. Because our lives are fragile and
finite, our life stories, and especially the values encoded within those stories, are
fragile too. Scheffler does not meet Behrendt’s problem on its own terms, showing
how our fragile and finite lives can nevertheless achieve narrative unity from within
our own individual perspectives. Indeed, he concedes they cannot achieve such a
unity. Scheffler instead reconfigures the problem so that responsibility for our self-
narratives falls to subsequent generations. Our personal narratives, truncated by
death, can achieve a sort of closure or conclusion if there exist subsequent
generations who preserve our values. We are, according to Scheffler, ultimately
dependent for the Narrative coherence of our lives on those who (we hope) will
come after us. Having staked our claim to our own values, we nevertheless take the
risk of leaving their fate, and the fate of our own self-narratives, to others. Our lives
are redeemed not through our own works, but through the grace of others.
Strawson contrasts the Narrativist outlook with his own self-awareness, which he
dubs ‘‘episodic’’. An Episodic ‘‘does not figure oneself, considered as a self, as
something that was there in the (further) past and will be there in the (further)
future.’’ (Strawson 2004: 430). The self of the episodic is punctate, with ‘‘little or no
sense that one was there in the (further) past and will be there in the future, although
one is perfectly well aware that one has long-term continuity considered as a whole
human being.’’ Lacking a sense of a persisting self, ‘‘Episodics are likely to have no
particular tendency to see their life in Narrative terms.’’ (Strawson 2004: 430)
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Strawson does not seem to be denying diachronic personal identity outright: We
have, he writes, ‘‘long-term continuity as a whole human being.’’ But that continuity
does not rest on anything like first-personal psychological continuity.
So far as I am aware, no systematic studies have been done regarding the
prevalence of the Narrativist and Episodic outlooks within human populations. Yet
supposing that the Episodic self-understanding is coherent and possible, then such
individuals neither have nor desire a personalized relationship with the future. The
issue at hand is whether Episodics might have reason to lament human extinction
anyway. They clear cannot have the reasons Narrativists have for such lament,
namely, that their life narratives will be prematurely truncated if there are no
subsequent generations to share their values. Episodics presumably have no interest
in having coherent life narratives.
Yet Episodics may recognize reasons for lamenting human extinction that are
arguably as morally upright as those recognized by Narrativists. The Narrativist
hope for a collective afterlife is strangely egoistic. Her own evaluative narrative will
not be complete unless subsequent generations exist to complete it. For Episodics,
the role of the collective afterlife is not to ensure that their self-conception is
vindicated by the passage of time, for they lack any such cross-temporal self-
conception. Episodics see value in the collective afterlife simply in the fact that to
the extent that the human species existing for a longer duration rather than a shorter
one brings about greater overall value, then the collective afterlife represents a
closer approximation to a moral ideal. Of course, as we saw in Sect. 2, whether this
is so is a contingent fact, and so for Episodics, there are not reasons as such to hope
for the collective afterlife. Yet Episodics can coherently hope for the continued
existence of the human species on the grounds that its continued existence results in
a better state of the world overall. Our hopes, after all, need not all flow from
personal reasons.
5 Conclusion
I have sought to show that at the very least, the apparent reasonableness of hoping
for the collective afterlife does not have the evaluative implications Scheffler posits.
Beings who embrace experientialism and consequentialism but reject conservatism
and the necessity of a personalized relationship with the future have reasons, at least
as strong as the beings envisioned by Scheffler, for wanting the human species to
survive (and flourish) well beyond their deaths. The nature of these reasons differs
from Scheffler’s; they are impersonal and consequentialist.
Most crucially, time functions very differently in structuring the valuing practices
of such beings. On Scheffler’s picture, we are beings for whom the fact that time
passes asymmetrically—from past to present to future—is both metaphysically and
ethically fundamental. We experience ourselves not merely as moving through time
but as narratively shaping time’s passage to our own ends and ambitions. Scheffler
does not put it this way, but the temporal boundedness of human life seems to
function as a necessary condition for value to be personal. Were we immortal, then
much of the conceptual repertoire we use in practical deliberation, including loss,
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illness, injury, risk, and so on, would have no application, according to Scheffler
(Scheffler 2013: 96–97). Valuing is an attempt to impose order on the contingencies
that unfold over time, to make time
answerable to us. To value something is to resist the transitoriness of time; it is
to insist that the passage of time lacks normative authority. Things may come
and things may go, but we decide what matters. (Scheffler 2013: 61)
In effect, we need mortality and the temporal scarcity in order to render our
‘‘assignments of value’’ coherent (Scheffler 2013: 99). Yet death, on this picture, is
significant not only because it makes time personally scarce. It also interrupts our
efforts to impose a normative order on time. The existence of future human
generations (Scheffler hopes) can rescue us from this evaluative disintegration.
Here I have outlined an alternative normative framework—experientialist,
consequentialist, non-conservative, personally unconcerned with whether one’s
values survive into the future—that provides a different framework for justifying
Scheffler’s afterlife conjecture. This framework does not assign time the same
relationship to value as Scheffler does. For Scheffler, time is a medium we seek to
shape and differentiate, both individually and collectively, in an effort to harness
time to our own purposes. The alternative framework I have suggested here sees
time as a brute metaphysical condition or limit, but one lacking the ethical
significance Scheffler assigns it. Under this framework, time is more akin to a
shapeless or homogeneous space each of whose parts are of equal ethical
significance, each moment identical to any other insofar as it represents an
opportunity to realize what is valuable. To the extent that realizing more value
requires more people, and more people requires more time during which people may
exist, the collective afterlife is valuable simply because it may offer us more time
during which value may be realized. The framework I have described thus sees time
as a boundary encompassing human agency as a whole. Each additional future
human life merely expands the area inside that boundary. Scheffler’s framework, in
contrast, sees time as normatively structuring individual human lives, lives that
overlap in time and thereby become normatively entangled, as past traditions shape
current practices and current practices shape future hopes.
Note that I have not argued in favor of either Scheffler’s evaluative framework or
the alternative described here. In this respect, my conclusions are friendly to
Scheffler, inasmuch as they indicate that the case for the afterlife conjecture need
not rest on the four specific features he ascribes to our evaluative frameworks.
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